Basit bir endojen büyüme modelinde devlet harcamaları ve mali kısıtlamalar by Yılmaz, Şakir Devrim
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Government Spending and Fiscal Rules in a Simple 
Endogenous Growth Model 
 
 
 
 
SAKIR DEVRIM YILMAZ 
103622006 
 
 
 
 
 
İSTANBUL BİLGİ ÜNİVERSİTESİ 
SOSYAL BİLİMLER ENSTİTÜSÜ 
IKTISAT YÜKSEK LİSANS PROGRAMI 
 
 
 
 
Tez Danismani: Ege Yazgan 
2007 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
Government Spending and Fiscal Rules in a Simple 
Endogenous Growth Model 
 
(Basit Bir Endojen Buyume Modelinde Devlet Harcamalari ve 
Mali Kisitlamalar)  
 
 
 
 
 
SAKIR DEVRIM YILMAZ 
103622006 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Tez Danışmanının Adı Soyadı(İMZASI)         : EGE YAZGAN 
Jüri Üyelerinin Adı Soyadı (İMZASI)               : .......................................... 
Jüri Üyelerinin Adı Soyadı (İMZASI)               : .......................................... 
 
 
Tezin Onaylandığı Tarih     : ......................................... 
 
 
Toplam Sayfa Sayısı:40 
 
Anahtar Kelimeler (Türkçe)   Anahtar Kelimeler (İngilizce)       
1)Mali Kisitlamalar    1)Fiscal Rules 
2)Endojen Buyume    2)Endogenous Growth 
3)Altyapi Yatirimi    3)Infrastructure 
4)Simulasyon          4)Numerical Analysis 
5)Saglik Harcamalari    5)Health 
 
 
 
  
 
ABSTRACT 
This thesis attempts to analyze the implications of imposing a Golden Rule of public finance 
(where the government is allowed to borrow for infrastructure investment) and a standard 
Primary Surplus Rule on fiscal balances and growth in an endogenous growth model with 
productive public infrastructure and health spending. I assume a closed economy with no 
money creation so the government’s only source of revenue is taxes on output and interest 
income. Due to the high complexity and non-linearity of the model, numerical simulations are 
performed to analyze the transitional dynamics following various shocks. It is shown, under 
the calibrated parameter values that the Golden Rule performs better in terms of growth and 
speed of convergence than the primary surplus rule. Further, the numerical simulations also 
show that constraining the government to borrow for other forms of productive spending such 
as health through fiscal rules may entail significant growth and debt-reduction costs. 
 
OZET 
Bu tez Kamu finansmaninin altin kurali olarak da bilinen ve devletin yalnizca altyapi 
yatirimlari icin borclanmasina olanak saglayan “Altin Kural” ile standart faiz disi fazla hedefi 
mali kisitlamalarinin buyume ve kamu finansmani uzerindeki etkisini altyapi ve saglik 
harcamalarinin uretken oldugu endojen bir buyume modelinde incelemektedir. Modelde para 
olmamakla birlikte develetin tek gelir kaynagi uretim ve faiz geliri uzerinden aldigi vergi 
olarak varsayilmistir. Modelin lineer olmayan ve karmasik yapisi nedeniyle analitik cozumun 
yerine model t+50 icin simulasyonla cozulmustur. Secilen parametrelerle Altin Kural’in 
buyume ve dengeye yakinsama acisindan faiz disi fazla kuralindan daha iyi performans 
gosterdigi bulunmustur. Ayrica, sonuclar  altyapi haricindeki uretken devlet harcamalarinda 
bu tarz kurallarla kisitlamaya gidilmesinin buyumeye ve kamu dengesine olumsuz etkiler 
yapabilecegini gostermistir.  
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1 Introduction
There has been much debate in recent years on whether explicit scal frame-
works may help to achieve and maintain scal discipline. Fiscal rules, in
particular, have taken the form of maintaining xed targets for the decit
(variously dened) and/or public debt ratios to GDP. Such rules have been
used in industrial and developing countries alike. In the euro area, the com-
mitment was made under the Stability and Growth Pact to limit the decit
to 3 percent of GDP. Brazil introduced a Fiscal Responsibility Law in May
2000 that prohibits nancial support operations among di¤erent levels of
government and requires that limits on the indebtedness of each level of gov-
ernment be set by the Senate. Similarly, Turkey has been targeting a strong
primary surplus since the break of the last crisis in 2001.
A common criticism of standard decit rules (including balanced budget
rules) is that they are inexible (to the extent that they are dened irrespec-
tive of the cyclical position of the economy) and tend to be pro-cyclical. In
response, decit rules have been rened and are now often applied either to a
cyclically adjusted decit measure (such as the structural budget decit) or
an average over the economic cycle. Chile, for instance, introduced in early
2000 a structural surplus rule (of 1 percent of GDP) that allows for limited
decits during recessions. The budget is adjusted not only for the e¤ects of
the business cycle on public nances, but also uctuations in the price of cop-
per (Chiles main export commodity). By doing so, advocates claim, these
rules may allow the operation of automatic stabilizers and possibly provide
some room for discretionary policy within the cycle.
However, this increased exibility comes at a cost, because the benchmark
against which scal performance is to be judged is made more complicated
especially if estimates of potential output are revised, as is often the case.
This increases the scope to bypass the rules, making them potentially harder
to enforce, which in turn may undermine their credibility. In countries with
a poor track record of policy consistency, this may be particularly costly and
lead to higher interest rates potentially exacerbating debt sustainability
problems.
Another criticism of decit rules is that they discourage public invest-
ment. This line of criticism particularly directed to the primary surplus rules
advocated by the IMF to most developing countries in order to strengthen
public balances (BSB, 2005). In such a setting, the government is only al-
lowed to nance interest payments through borrowing, which in turn results
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in the abolition of infrastructure and various other potentially productive
investment due to budgetary concerns. Therefore, some economists have ad-
vocated a golden ruleapproach to budgetary policy, whereby the focus is
on maintaining a balance or surplus on the current account (that is, cur-
rent revenues less current expenditures), with capital expenditure nanced
from government savings and borrowing. However, this rule has also been
criticized on a number of grounds; critics have pointed out, among other
arguments, its vulnerability to creative accounting, and the fact that a pref-
erential treatment of physical investment could bias expenditure decisions
against spending other potentially productive outlays (such as education and
health), and stress that what matters is the overall capital stock, be it private
or public (see, for instance Buti, Eij¢ nger, and Franco (2003)).
In essence, components of recurrent expenditure (such as maintenance
spending on infrastructure, schools, and hospitals) may be equally impor-
tant to maintain the quality of the services produced by the capital stock
in those categories. In a purely growth context, therefore, the question that
arises is where should one draw the line when imposing a scal rule? This
is the question that I address in this thesis, in the context of an endoge-
nous growth model with public infrastructure and health spending and debt.
In addition to spending in infrastructure, the government spends on health
services (which raises labor productivity). Infrastructure spending, in turn,
a¤ects the production of both commodities and health services. Although
the model could be extended to include education, maintenance or other pro-
ductive government spending, the current distinction between infrasturcture
and health spending is su¢ cient to point out the a¤ects of di¤erent scal
regimes on various policy experiments.
The remainder of the thesis is organized as follows. Part II expands the
discussion on the benets and disadvantages of scal rules, and particularly
of golden rule and primary surplus rule. Part III presents the analytical
model and examines the nature of the equilibrium growth path with a bal-
anced budget, which is called the benchmarkcase, as well specifying the
two alternative scal rules: a golden rule and a primary surplus rule. Be-
cause the resulting dynamic system cannot be solved analytically, numerical
simulations are performed in each case. Part IV presents the calibration
procedure and reports the results of experiments, where I consider both the
stability properties of the model and the speed of convergence (in response
to various shocks) to the steady state. I investigate, in particular, which rule
yields higher steady-state growth and more rapid convergence than the other
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one, and also analyze the dynamics of the debt-output ratio and debt-private
capital ratio in response to a variety of policy experiments. This part also
delivers a brief sensitivity analysis (with respect to one of the parameters)
in order to assess the robustness of the results derived with initially cali-
brated values. The nal part of the thesis o¤ers some concluding remarks
and identies possible lines of future research.
3
2 Literature Review
As noted earlier, a common criticism of budget rules that take the form of
strict limits on scal decit-to-GDP ratios is that they discourage public
investment. A scal rule that caps the overall budget decit puts both cur-
rent and investment spending on an equal footing in the measurement of the
decit that is subject to the rule. The danger, of course, is that whenever
the rule becomes binding, the government will choose to cut those spending
categories that are politically least costly to get rid of. If the political cost
of postponing or abandoning investment projects is lower than the political
cost of constraining current expenditure as is often the case in practice
an overall decit rule will entail a built-in bias against public investment
spending and may therefore be detrimental to growth, in the presence, for
instance, of a complementarity e¤ect between public capital and private in-
vestment. The primary surplus rule particularly opens way to such a bias
against public investment by restraining the government to borrow for in-
frastructure projects, yielding to the abandonment of investment projects
rather than reducing unproductive current expenditure.
The existence of this bias has led a number of economists, most notably
Blanchard and Giavazzi (2004), to advocate reliance on a golden rule,
whereby the focus is on maintaining a current balance (that is, current rev-
enues less current expenditures) or surplus, with capital expenditures being
nanced from government savings and borrowing.1 Under the Blanchard-
Giavazzi rule, governments can borrow in net terms on a continuous basis
only to the extent that this net borrowing nance net public investment,
that is, gross investment less capital depreciation (which counts as current
spending)2. This rule therefore allows gross borrowing for the purpose of
renancing maturing debt, which would leave net debt una¤ected. They ar-
gued that, as a result of the golden rule, the debt stock of European Union
(EU) countries would gradually become fully backed by public capital. The
existing debt stock, reecting past decits, would gradually shrink in relation
1To the extent that public investment boosts the economys output potential on a
permanent rather than just temporary basis, it caters to the needs of not only the present
generation but also future generations. On intergenerational equity grounds, this provides
a rationale to spread the costs of such investment over both current and future generations,
by nancing investment through government borrowing instead of current tax revenues.
2Musgrave (1939) was an early proponent of a rule aimed at excluding capital outlays
from the operating budget, while including depreciation of the government capital stock.
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to the economys GDP as a result of the requirement that no new borrow-
ing would be permitted in net terms to nance current spending. All new
net borrowing would be matched by net investment, that is, increases in the
public capital stock. Blanchard and Giavazzi (2004) also noted that public
investment as a share of GDP has fallen in the euro area since the Pact was
agreed upon. Moreover, Everaert (1997) found that declining public physi-
cal capital investment has signicantly lowered long-run economic growth in
Europe. In Belgium for example, he estimates that the decline can account
for a decrease in economic activity of about 0.6 percentage points each year.
However, Turrini (2004) argued that the impact of the EU rules for scal
discipline is not a clear-cut one. On the one hand, after phase II of EMU,
public investment is found to be more negatively a¤ected by debt levels. This
is consistent with the view that in the run-up to Maastricht the budgetary
adjustment implied a signicant decline in public investment, especially in
high-debt countries. On the other hand, results indicate that after phase II of
EMU public investment became positively related to previous period budget
balances, so that the improvement in the budget balances consequent to the
introduction of the EU scal rules may have helped to create room for public
investment in several EU countries.
At a more conceptual level, the golden rule itself has attracted much
criticism. First, advocates of the golden rule have often emphasized the need
to exclude capital expenditure on infrastructure from the scal decit rule.
In countries with large infrastructure gaps, certain projects (such as roads,
ports, airports) may indeed have rates of return that are so high, and a degree
of complementarity with private investment that is so high, that they justify
receiving priority in the design of a public investment program. However,
in other countries (particularly low-income countries), investment in health
and human capital may be an equally important priority, in part because it
may have a larger impact on growth. Excluding public investment in basic
infrastructure only (as opposed to investment in schools and hospitals) from
scal targets would create a bias against these other components of public
investment.
Second, this rule continues to be evoked as a good guide to policy even
in the face of much evidence that some current expenditure such as on
operation and maintenance that keeps existing infrastructure in good condi-
tion or that contributes to health outcomes and the accumulation of human
capital can promote growth more e¤ectively than capital expenditure per
se as documented by Kalaitzidakis et al (2004). Put di¤erently, components
5
of recurrent expenditure such as spending on schools, and hospitals) may be
equally important to maintain the quality of the services produced by the
capital stock in those categories.
Moreover, there is growing evidence suggesting that in these countries,
externalities associated with public infrastructure may be more important
that commonly thought. Indeed, it has been found that infrastructure may
have a sizable impact on health and education outcomes.3 As noted in
Agenor (2005c), there is a high level of microeconomic evidence supporting
the complementarity between public infrastructure and health and educa-
tion. Among the various studies, Behrman and Wolfe (1987), Rosenzweig
et al (1997), Lavy et al (1996) have shown that access to clean water and
sanitation reduces infant mortality by a signicant amount, suggesting that
infrastructure helps to improve health and thereby productivity. As argued
in Agenor (2005b) and Agenor et al (2006), access to electricity will also
improve health outcomes through reducing the cost of boiling water, and
reducing the need to rely on smoky traditional fuels for cooking as well as its
essentiality for the functioning of hospitals and the delivery of health services.
Better transportation networks also contribute to easier access to health care,
particularly in rural areas. With regards to the productivity e¤ect of health
on output, Sala-i Martin et al (2004) found that a positive relation between
increase in life expentancy and increase in long run growth.
There is also evidence of direct linkages between infrastructure and ed-
ucation. Electricity allows for more studying and greater access to learning
technology. Enrollment rates and the quality of education tends to improve
with better transportation networks, particularly in rural areas. Greater ac-
cess to sanitation and clean water in schools also tends to raise attendance
rates(Agenor 2005c). Although I do not attempt to model explicitly the im-
pact of infrastructure on education, and its implications for the design of
scal rules, the focus on health is su¢ cient to illustrate the potential impli-
cations of adding a learning technology.
The foregoing suggestion suggests that, alternative rules may have an
ambiguous e¤ect.As noted earlier, current spending on education and health
enhances human capital. Excluding them from say, a primary surplus rule
is all the more important in countries where vast amounts of ow spending
in infrastructure are wasted and turn only partly into public capital, and
3See Agénor and Moreno-Dodson (2006) and Agénor and Neanidis (2006) for a more
detailed discussion.
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if public capital in infrastructure has a small complementarity e¤ect with
private investment. In such conditions, singling out public investment from
other budget items makes little sense; a tax reform that alleviates distortions
and translates into a lowers tax burden on rms may leads to higher private
investment (and higher growth) and may be preferable to an increase in pub-
lic investment. At the same time, however, public capital in infrastructure
may have (as noted in the introduction) a sizable impact on health and ed-
ucation outcomes. If these e¤ects are su¢ ciently strong, a rule that entails
some bias toward investment in infrastructure only may still lead to higher
growth rates despite some degree of ine¢ ciency in the investment process
itself. The question that arises, therefore, is where should one draw the line
in imposing a decit rule. However, despite the importance of the issue, very
few papers have attempted to address the a¤ects of di¤erent scal regimes
on growth in a model including debt accumulation. In a continuous-time set-
ting, while Ghosh et al (2004a) focused on steady state welfare-maximizing
solutions under the golden rule and primary surplus rule, Ghosh et al (2004b)
and Ghosh and Nolan (2005) studied the steady state characteristics of en-
dogenous growth models with public infrastructure capital under the same
rules. Similarly, Greiner et al (2000) also analyze the steady-state e¤ects
of an increase in tax rate and infrastructure spending under golden rule and
primary surplus rule but they do not deliver any transitional dynamics analy-
sis4. However, particularly the speed of convergence and volatility during the
transition may prove to be signicantly important for the performance of the
economy in the short run.
The analytical framework and subsequent numerical simulations in this
research will attempt to shed some light on the importance of these various
e¤ects. In line with the discussion above and following Agenor (2005c), I will
deploy a Barro (1990) type endogenous growth model where public infrastruc-
ture and health spending enter the production function for output directly,
and the production of health services similarly depends on infrastructure and
health spending. The model will be simulated for t+50 periods, and the tran-
sition to the steady state in response to a shock to policy parameters under
the golden rule and primary surplus rule will be compared. Thus, as well as
providing a steady-state analysis, this research will additionally deliver the
4Annicchiarico et al (2004) use an overlapping-generations model in order to analyze
transitional dynamics. However, their model denes scal rules as periodical target values
for debt rather than restictions on borrowing as in Ghosh et al (2004a), Greiner et al
(2000) and others.
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transitional dynamics associated with various policies under golden rule and
primary surplus rule.
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3 The Analytical Model
The economy I consider is populated by an innitely-lived representative
household, who produces a single traded commodity. The good can be used
for consumption or investment. The government has no access to seigniorage
(i.e there is no money creation and therefore no ination tax in the model) but
can issue bonds to nance its decit. It collects a proportional tax on output,
and spends on infrastructure and health services. In order to keep the model
simple and tractable, I will asume that public infrastructure spending enters
the production function as a ow rather than as a stock. In a purely growth
context as in this research, this assumption does not e¤ect the results in a
signicant way (Agenor 2005a). I also assume that the governmnet services
its debt and provides lump-sum transfers to households. Infrastructure and
health services (which are produced by the government) are provided free of
charge.
3.1 Production
Commodities are produced, in quantity Y , with private capital, KP , public
capital in infrastructure, GI , and e¤ective labor, dened as the product of
the quantity of labor and productivity, A. Population growth is zero. Nor-
malizing the population size to unity and assuming that the technology is
Cobb-Douglas yields5
Y = GIA
K1  P ; (1)
where ;  2 (0; 1).
Productivity depends solely on the availability of health services, H. For
simplicity, I assume that the relationship between A and H is linear, so that
A = H. Using this result with (1) yields
Y = (
GI
KP
)(
H
KP
)KP : (2)
From standard conditions for prot maximization, the (pre-tax) wage
rate, !, and the direct pre-tax rental rate on capital, rK , are given by
! = Y=H; rK = Y=KP ; (3)
5Throughout the thesis, time subscripts are omitted for simplicity, and a dot over a
variable is used to denote its time derivative.
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where   1    .
As noted earlier, access to public infrastructure is provided at no cost to
users. As in Agénor and Neanidis (2006), I will assume in what follows that
the implicit rent corresponding to the marginal return on public capital,
Y=KI , accrues to private capital. The e¤ective rate of return on private
physical capital, r, exceeds therefore the direct marginal product given in
equation (3). Indeed, from the identity Y = !H + rKP , as well as the
condition on !, r is given by
r =
(1  )Y
KP
> rK : (4)
Production of health services requires combining government spending
on health, GH , and public capital in infrastructure. Assuming also a Cobb-
Douglas technology yields
H = GIG
1 
H ; (5)
where  2 (0; 1). Thus, GH is pure(or unproductive) public consump-
tion when  = 1.
3.2 Household Optimization
The representative households optimization problem can be specied as
max
C
V =
Z 1
0
C1 1=
1  1= exp( t)dt;  6= 1; (6)
where C is consumption,  the discount rate, and  is the elasticity of in-
tertemporal substitution.
The households resource constraint is given by
_W = _KP + _B = (1  )(!H + rW ) + T   C; (7)
where W = KP + Bis total assets, consisting of private physical capital
and government bonds, in quantity B, T is lump-sum transfers (taken as
given by the household),  2 (0; 1) is the tax rate on income. Taxes are
levied on interest-inclusive income, with interest income consisting not only
of the (e¤ective) return to capital but also of the return to government
10
bonds.Therefore !H + rW = Y + rB is the tax base. Through standard
(after-tax) arbitrage conditions, the rate of return on both categories of as-
sets is identical and equal to r. For simplicity, I assume that private capital
does not depreciate.
The household takes public policies and the depreciation rate as given
when choosing the optimal sequence of consumption. Using (1), (6), and (7),
the current-value Hamiltonian for problem (6) can be written as
L =
C1 1=
1  1= + [(1  )(!H + rW ) + T   C];
where  is the co-state variable associated with constraint (7). From the rst-
order condition dH=dC = 0 and the co-state condition  dH=dW = _  ,
optimality conditions for this problem take the familiar form
C 1= = ; (8)
_ = [  (1  )r]; (9)
together with the budget constraint (7) and the transversality condition
lim
t!1
W exp( t) = 0: (10)
3.3 Government
The government invests in infrastructure capital, GI , and spends on health
services, GH , unproductive expenses, GU , transfers, T , and interest pay-
ments, rB. As noted earlier, it also collects a proportional tax  on output.
Thus, the government budget constraint is given by6
_B =
X
h=I;H;U
Gh + T + rB   (Y + rB): (11)
I rst begin with the assumption that all components of spending are
xed fractions of total tax revenues:
Gh = h(Y + rB); h = I;H; U (12)
6From (7), (11), and the identity Y = !H + rKP , the economys consolidated budget
constraint (or equivalently, the goods market equilibrium condition) is C + i=I;HGh +
_KP = Y .
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Using these equations, the government budget constraint, equation (11),
can then be rewritten as
_B = rB   (1 
X
h=I;H;T;U
h)(Y + rB): (13)
Finally, the government cannot run a Ponzi scheme, which implies that
it is subject to the transversality condition
lim
t!1
B exp[ 
Z 1
0
rudu] = 0;
or equivalently
B0 +
Z 1
0
(G+ T ) exp[
Z t
0
rudu]dt =
Z 1
0
Z exp[
Z t
0
rudu]dt: (14)
where G =
X
h=I;H
Gh and Z = (Y + rB).7
3.4 Balanced Budget Rule
As a benchmark case, let us consider the case of a zero decit (or balanced
budget) rule, I denote this rule BBR, and implement it by imposing _B = 0 in
(11) and solving the government budget constraint for lump-sum transfers,
T . Equivalently, setting the constant value of B equal to zero as well, the
model determines endogenously the share of spending on transfers, T :
T = 1 
X
h=I;H;U
h: (15)
This rule ensures that the transversality condition (14) is satised. It is a
particular case of the rule _B = BB, where B 2 (0; 1) is a constant growth
rate.
Determining the balanced growth path (BGP) associated with BBR pro-
ceeds in three steps. First, note that !H + rW = !H + rKP = Y , and from
(1) and (5),
Y = GI (
GIG
1 
H
KP
)KP ;
7Note that economies that have unsustainable policies in the medium run may have a
sustainable public debt for t!1.
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Using (12), this expression can be rewritten as
Y
KP
=

I(
Y
KP
)
+ 
H(
Y
KP
)
(1 )
; (16)
using (4),
Y
KP
= 
+=

I 
(1 )=

H 
+=
: (17)
where 
  1    .
Second, from the budget constraint (7) with _B = B = 0,
_KP = (1  )Y + T   C;
using (15),
_KP = qY   C;
where q  1  Ph=I;H;U h, so that q 2 (0; 1). Dividing by KP ;
_KP
KP
= q
+=

I 
(1 )=

h 
+=
   c; (18)
where c = C=KP .
Third, taking logs of (8) and di¤erentiating with respect to time yields
_C=C =  ( _=). Substituting (9) this expression yields, setting s  (1  
)(1  ),
_C
C
= [s(
Y
KP
)  ]; : (19)
that is, using (17),
_C
C
= s
+=

I 
(1 )=

h 
+=
   ; (20)
Equations (18), and (20) can be further condensed into a rst-order non-
linear di¤erential equation in c = C=KP
_c
c
= (s  q)+=
I (1 )=
H +=
 + c  ; (21)
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On the balanced growth path, consumtion and private capital grow at
the same rate and therefore _C
C
=
_KP
KP
: This implies that in steady state equi-
librium,
_c
c
= 0: However, since the coe¢ cent of c in (21) is positive, the
equilibrium is (globally) unstable and the economy has to start from steady
state to be able to keep on staying at steady state. Setting
_c
c
= 0 in (21)
gives the steady state level of consumption as
~c = + (q   s)+=
I (1 )=
H +=
; (22)
where where ~c denotes the stationary value of c.
Inserting this result in (18) gives the steady state growth rate as
 = s
+=

I 
(1 )=

H 
+=
   ; (23)
which will be positive as long as s+=
I 
(1 )=

h 
+=
 > 8: In a
regime with a balanced budget rule, the transversality condition takes the
form
lim
t!1
KP exp( t) = 0; (24)
since there is no debt accumulation and B = 0: From (9),
_

=   (1  )(1  )+=
I (1 )=
H +=
; (25)
Noting that the transversality condition will be satised if _

+
_KP
KP
 
 < 0 and using (25), (23), and s = (1   )(1   ) it follows that s(  
1)
+=

I 
(1 )=

H 
+=
  < 0 is the necessary condition for the transver-
sality condition to hold. It is clearly seen that if  < 1; which is in general
true for especially developing countries as mentioned in the calibration sec-
tion below, the condition is automatically satised. Therefore, assuming that
 < 1; the transversality condition holds regardless of the values of policy
parameters H ;  ; and I or technology parameters and :
8As shown in the simulations,  is very close to zero, so this is not such a binding
condition
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However, the regime displays no transitional dynamics and following a
shock, the consumption private capital ratio must jump to the new steady
state value immediately.
3.5 Alternative Fiscal Rules
I now consider two alternative scal rules and begin with the golden rule,
given the attention that it has received. As discussed earlier, funding capital
expenditure from current revenues would imply a disincentive to undertake
projects producing deferred benets but entailing up-front costs; this disin-
centive may be particularly high during periods of scal adjustment.In tis
setting, it is only the public infrastructure capital spending that should be
nanced via borrowing while the part that covers depreciation (or mainte-
nance), which is not explicitly accounted for here, should remain tax nanced.
3.5.1 The Golden Rule
The golden rule (denoted GR) can be implemented in this framework by
requiring that the sum of (current) government spending on health, transfers,
and interest payments, must be equal to a fraction, ; of tax revenues:
GU +GH + T + rB = (Y + rB); (26)
where  2 (0; 1):I will also assume that all spending shares continue to
be xed fractions of total revenues, as indicated in (12). Thus, equation (26)
determines residually lump-sum transfers as
T = (   H   U)(Y + rB)  rB; (27)
Combining (11) and (26) implies also that, borrowing increases as a result
of excess investment in infrastructure over the remaining tax revenues:
_B = GI   (1  )(Y + rB); (28)
Using (12), equation (28) now becomes
_B =  (1  I   ) [Y + rB]; (29)
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Dividing (29) by B yields,
_B
B
=  (1  I   )b 1[( Y
KP
) + rb]; (30)
where b = B=KP . From (4),
_B
B
=  (1  I   )b 1[1 + (1  )b] Y
KP
;
_B
B
=  (1  I   )b 1g( Y
KP
); (31)
where g = [1 + (1  )b]
Equation (31) implies that debt increases over time only if I +  > 1
The household budget constraint (7) can be rewritten as
_KP
KP
=  
_B
B
b+ (1  )[ Y
KP
+ rb] + z   c;
where z = T=KP . Substituting (31) in this expression,
_KP
KP
= [(1  I   ) + (1  )] g( Y
KP
) + z   c; (32)
Finally, dividing (27) by KP yields
z = (   H   U)(Y + rB
KP
)  rb;
that is, using (4),
z = [(   H   U)g   (1  )b] ( Y
KP
); (33)
Substituting into (32), and simplifying,
_KP
KP
= [(1  g] ( Y
KP
)  c; (34)
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where   I + H + U :
Note, however, that equation (17) is not valid under golden or primary
surplus rule rule because !H + rW = Y + rB:Therefore, equation (16)
becomes
Y
KP
=

I(
Y + rB
KP
)
+ 
h(
Y + rB
KP
)
(1 )
; (35)
which, after the same steps as above gives,
Y
KP
= 
+=

I 
(1 )=

h 
+=
g+=
: (36)
Therefore,
_C
C
= s
+=

I 
(1 )=

h 
+=
g+=
   ; (37)
and
_KP
KP
= [(1  g] +=
I (1 )=
h +=
g+=
   c; (38)
Using (36), equations (31), (37) and (38)can be further manipulated to
produce a rst-order di¤erential equation system in c, and b, where b =
Y
KP
;which consists of
_c
c
= fg + s  1g +=
I (1 )=
h (g)+=
   + c; (39)
_b
b
=

+ b 1(I +    1)

g   1	 +=
I (1 )=
h (g)+=
 + c; (40)
The BGP is a set of functions fc; bg1t=0 such that equations (39) and
(40), the budget constraint (26), and the transversality condition (10), are
satised, and consumption, debt and the stock of private capital, all grow at
the same constant rate .9The growth rate is given by (37) or equivalently
by (31).
9 is also the rate of growth of output of commodities and health services, given the
assumption of constant returns to scale.
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3.5.2 Primary Surplus Rule
Under a general primary surplus rule (PSR), the constraint linking current
expenditure and tax revenues is given by
GU +GH +GI + T = (Y + rB); (41)
which indicates that public spending on health and unproductive outlays,
investment in infrastructure, and transfers to households, must all be nanced
by a fraction  of total tax revenues.
Combining (11) and (41) yields
_B = rB   (1  )(Y + rB); (42)
which states that interest payments, to the extent that they are not covered
by a residual fraction 1   of tax revenues, must be nanced by borrowing.
Using (12) and dividing by B,
_B
B
=  (1  )b 1[( Y
KP
) + rb] + r;
which, using (36), and the denition of g, can be written as
_B
B
=

(   1)b 1g + (1  ) +=
I (1 )=
h (g)+=
: (43)
As in the previous section, dividing the household budget constraint (7)
by KP gives
_KP
KP
=  
_B
B
b+ (1  )[( Y
KP
) + rb] + z   c;
where z = T=KP . Using (12) and (41),
T = (   H   M   U   I) [Y + rB]; (44)
Dividing (44) by KP , together with (36), yields
z = [(   H   U   I)g] +=
I (1 )=
h (g)+=
; (45)
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Substituting (43) and (45) in the above equation, the growth rate of
private capital becomes
_KP
KP
= (1  g)+=
I (1 )=
h (g)+=
   c; (46)
The growth of rate of consumption, _C=C, is as dened in (19). Together
with (43) and (46), these equations can be rearranged to dene the dynamics
of the economy under the general primary surplus rule. The dynamic equa-
tions driving c, is given, as before, by (39), whereas the equation of motion
for b is now given by
_b
b
=

+ (   1)b 1 g   	 +=
I (1 )=
h (g)+=
 + c; (47)
The steady-state growth rate is given equivalently by (37), or, from (43).10
I therefore have two dynamic systems to consider: the Golden Rule (GR),
consisting of (39) and (40), and the Primary Surplus Rule (PSR), consisting
of (39), and (47), As discussed earlier, it was shown that under the balanced
budget rule (BBR), system is unstable in the vicinity of the BGP. For the
other rules as well, saddlepath stability (even in a local sense) is not guar-
anteed, given their high degree of nonlinearity and the complexity of the
relevant conditions. Indeed, in both systems, c can jump whereas b is pre-
determined. Saddlepath stability requires therefore one unstable (positive)
root. The Routh-Hurwicz conditions require that the determinant of the Ja-
cobian matrix of partial derivatives of the dynamic system be negative (in
order to exclude two negative or two positive roots). However, due to the
high non-linearity and complexity of the model, these conditions are very
di¢ cult to establish in an unambiguous way. Therefore, analytically, the
necessary conditions for saddlepath stability and the existence of a balanced
growth path with positive values for c and b cannot be derived. To examine
whether stability is veried under plausible values for the parameters, and to
study how the speed of convergence to the steady state (following a shock)
depends on the specication of the rule, so I turn to numerical simulations.
10In the simulation results reported later,  is set at  = 1; this assumption ensures
indeed that  > 0 in equation (43).
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4 Numerical Results
In order to conduct the numerical analysis in this chapter, the technology
and spending share parameters, along with initial values for output, debt and
private capital should be calibrated. Therefore, I proceed in this direction
now.
4.1 Calibration
As my starting point, the parameters are chosen to roughly match some
stylizedfacts about low-income developing countries with reasonably high
debt-output ratios. I consider an economy with output Y normalized to
1; 000. The private capital stock KP is set at 2,000, implying that the initial
private capital-output ratio is 2.11
The elasticities of production of goods with respect to public infrastruc-
ture spending and e¤ective labor,  and  respectively, are set equal to 0:2
and 0:5. These estimates imply a share of private capital in output equal to
0:3. For the health technology, an appropriate value for the coe¢ cient  is
more di¢ cult to identify, because most of the empirical evidence is micro-
economic in nature. At the same time, as noted earlier, assessing the impact
of infrastructure on growth and stability is a key purpose of the model. Ac-
cordingly, I choose an initial value of  = 0:2; to perform sensitivity analysis
below.
The rate of time preference, , is set at 10 percent. Interpreting each
period as 3 years, this gives a yearly discount value of 3.3 per cent, a fair
choice regarding the literature12. This leads to a discount factor of approxi-
mately 0:967. Private consumption, C, which is determined from the goods
market equilibrium condition, represents about 85 percent of output. The
intertemporal elasticity of substitution is set at 0:2. As noted earlier, this is
consistent with the evidence for developing countries, as discussed by Agénor
and Montiel (2006).
The tax rate on output (which is also the share of total government
spending in output),  , is set at 0:2. This value is in line with actual ratios
11These values are is in line with the calibrated values for same parameters in Agenor
(2005c)
12While Greiner et al (2000) take the discount rate 3 per cent, Agenor (2005c) uses 4
per cent instead. Therefore, the choice of the discont rate lies in between these two values.
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for many low-income countries, where taxation (which is essentially indirect
in nature) provides a more limited source of revenue than in higher-income
countries. The initial shares of government spending on infrastructure ser-
vices and health services, I and H respectively, are set at 0:2 and 0:25. The
share of unproductivespending, U (which here includes also public wages
and salaries, which are not explicitly accounted for) is set at 0:2. Thus, in
the benchmark case, the share of transfers , T , is 0:35, as implied by the
budget constraint (15). Multiplying these shares by the tax rate implies that
spending on infrastructure investment represents 4:0 percent of output in the
base period, whereas spending on health services amounts to 5:0 percent of
output. The estimates used here can be viewed as representing an inter-
mediate case of a government committed to allocating roughly half of its
resources to physical and human capital accumulation.
The initial stock of public debt, B is set at 400. The coe¢ cient  is set
at 1 for both computational simplicity, and to ensure that in the absence of
dynamic adjustment in the model, the government does not become a net
creditor in the steady state.
Calibration of the model around these initial values and parameters (which
involves also determining appropriate multiplicative constants in the produc-
tion functions for goods and educated labor) produces the baserun solution.
Given the values described above, initial ratios of c, and b are, respectively,
0:85, 0:21 for Golen Rule, whereas the initial steady-state growth rate is
equal to 2:5 percent.
4.2 Numerical Simulations
I now examine the stability and convergence properties of the models associ-
ated with the rules derived earlier. To do so I use both the base calibration
and the alternative cases described in the previous section. With consump-
tion being a forward-looking variable, I use the extended pathmethod of
Fair and Taylor (1984) as the solution procedure. This iterative procedure is
quite convenient (once a discrete-time approximation of the model is written)
because it allows one to solve perfect foresight models in their nonlinear form.
The terminal condition imposed on consumption is that its growth rate at
the terminal horizon (t+50 periods here) must be equal to the growth of the
private capital stock, given the condition that c = C=KP must be constant
along the balanced growth path. The simulations are performed using the
E-views program.
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4.2.1 Golden Rule
I rst experiment with the Golden Rule, increasing the government spending
shares on investment in infrastructure, and health and tracking the dynam-
ics of the ratio of public debt stock to private capital, B/Kp, public debt
stock to income measured as B/Y, and the growth rate of output. In or-
der to do so, the baseline solution with the initial values calibrated above is
rst calculated. Then, the shock is given to the policy parameters and the
model is re-simulated for t+50 periods and deviations from baseline values
are obtained. As the rst experiment, I assume that the spending share on
infrastructure increases by 5 % from 0.2 to 0.2513. Figure 1 displays the de-
viations from baseline values for debt private capital ratio, debt-output ratio
and the growth rate of output respectively in three panels in this case.
In GR, the e¤ect of the increase in infrastructure spending on debt accu-
mulation are twofold : An increase in the debt stock due to higher borrowing,
and a subsequent increase in interest payments as the marginal productivity
of private capital, r, also increases with the shock. The increase in interest
payments translates to a higher tax base and further increases borrowing for
infrastructure and crowds out private capital in subsequent periods but it
also increases transfers since all government spending is proportional to the
tax base. Therefore the overall e¤ect on output depends on the strength
of these a¤ects and relative productivity of these factors of production.The
upper and middle panels reveal that in response to an increase in vI , the
debt-output ratio drop instantenously and the magnitude of the drop gets
even larger in the rst periods. This is because public infrastructure spending
is assumed to enter the production function contemporenously and output
increases simultenously as vI increases but debt is a pre-determined variable
and therefore the level of debt remains constant for one period. For the
same reason, debt-private capital ratio remains constant for one period after
the shock, because both variables are predetermined. Apart from this, both
B=Kp and B=Y display volatile dynamics, falling signicantly initially but
stabilizing at higher values than the baseline. In essence, the debt-output
ratio increases much less than debt-private capital ratio (and stabilizes at a
value very close to the baseline) because the increase in vI directly e¤ects
output through infrastructure spending whereas the positive a¤ect on Kp
comes through indirect a¤ects on disposable income, (1  )Y; and transfers
13It is essential to note that the government nances infrastructure spending through
borrowing under Golden Rule, so borrowing increases each period as well.
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as well the negative crowding out of increase in debt on private capital ac-
cumulation (see 7).As the lower panel displays, the growth rate of output
increases instantenously as vI increases and then displays a cyclical pattern,
increasing initially but then falling as diminishing returns set in and the inter-
est rate -the return to private capital at the same time - stabilizes. However,
still, there is a signicant increase in growth as the steady state growth rate
increases by about 2%.
Next, consider the case that the government increases vH through bor-
rowing, althoug it is constrained by the rule to do so. In other words, let the
government violate the rule permanently and increase vH by 5 per cent from
0.25 to 0.3. This experiment in a way tries to investigate the dynamics if
the rule were altered and the government were allowed to borrow in order to
nance other productive spending at time 0. Figure 2 displays the dynamics
in this case. The upper panel shows that public debt-private capital ratio
behaves more or less similar to a increase in vI and stabilizes at a slightly
higher level than above because higher productivity of health compared to
infrastructure increases the return to private capital more after the shock and
the crowding out e¤ect of interest payments on transfers is higher when vH
increases by 5 per cent (see (27). Due to higher productivity of health than
infrastructure, the debt-output ratio stays strictly below the baseline value,
although additional spending is nanced via borrowing. In other words,
the positive a¤ect of additional health spending on output more than com-
pensates for the increase in the level of debt, and therefore B=Y falls both
through transition and at the steady state. Similarly, the growth rate of
output is also higher than the case of an increase in vI through borrowing.
4.2.2 Primary Surplus Rule
I now conduct a similar analysis using the primary surplus rule. However,
in this case, since the government is only allowed to borrow for interest pay-
ments, an increase in the share of infrastructure spending should be mathced
with a simultenous decrease in one of the other spending shares14. Figure
3 and Figure 4 display the dynamics when the 5 per cent increase in vI is
nanced by a 5 percent decrease in share of transfers (vT )and share of health
spending (vH) respectively. When the increase in vi is nanced by a cut in
14As above, it could be assumed that the rule is altered at time 0 and the government
is allowed to borrow for productive spending here as well. However, the analysis in this
paper is su¢ cient to emphasize the point so I will not pursue this way here.
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vT or Vh, the behaviour of debt-private capital ratio and debt-output ra-
tio entirely depends on the relative productivities of infrastructure, private
capital and health. When the cut in vT nances the additional spending on
infrastructure, the debt-private capital ratio and debt-output ratio both fall
since infrastructure is calibrated to be more productive than private cap-
ital with the assigned parameter values. As a result of this, the growth
rate of output is also higher than the baseline value through the transition
and the steady state, although the growth performance is worse than the
golden rule (Figure 5). However, the opposite is true when the additional
spending is nanced by a decline in health services. Both debt-private capi-
tal ratio and debt-output ratio increase and stabilize at a higher value than
baseline. Further, the growth rate of output falls and stabilizes at a lower
value than the baseline. Basically, this experiment, together with an in-
crease in vH through borrowing under the golden rule as above, captures the
aforementioned bias towards infrastructure investment under a strict bud-
getary regime. If the government is restricted to borrow for other productive
spending than infrastructure as under the Golden Rule, the emphasis on
infrastructure investment might lead to a lower growth and worse budget
performance (measured as B=Y ) than possible through borrowing to nance
(at least partially) other productive spending, specied as health here. Sim-
ilarly, under a primary surplus rule where the government is not allowed to
borrow to nance any type of current or investment spending, a bias towards
infrastructure might lead to a reduction on other possibly productive spend-
ing, which might hamper growth and lead to a worse budget performance.
In a purely growth context, this in turn requires a very careful assesment of
the relative productivities of certain types of government spending.
4.2.3 Cut in Unproductive Spending
Next, consider the case that the increase in infrastructure spending is -
nanced by a cut in unproductive government spending under both rules.
Figure 6 compares the behaviour of variables of interest. First of all, it is
clear from upper and middle panel that if we consider the debt ratios, golden
rule performs much better in terms of volatility and stabilizes more quickly
than primary surplus rule. The main reason for this is that the level of debt
is not a¤ected by interest payments under GR and therefore the variations
in interest rate is not reected in the stabilization of debt-private capital
and debt-output ratio. On the contrary, under the PSR, the volatility of the
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interest rate also causes a large volatility in these ratios. The fall in both
ratios is signicantly higher under the primary surplus rule than under the
golden rule throughout the transition but at the steady state, they stabilize
slightly below zero and very close to each other. With respect to growth,
the lower panel shows that golden rule is both more stable and yields higher
growth than primary surplus rule this time.
4.2.4 Increase in Tax Rate
And nally, let us assume that the government increases the tax rate by 2%
from 0.2 to 0.22. This will lead to more resources from national income being
spent on infrastructure and health, as well as an increase in the total level of
unproductive spending and transfers and a fall in disposable income that will
create a crowding out a¤ect on private capital. The results are displayed in
the three panels in Figure 7. In this case, debt-private capital ratio and debt-
output ratio behave in a similar way as above. The only signicant di¤erence
is that the Golen Rule now stabilizes at a slightly higher B=KP ratio than
the baseline, but still it is more stable than primary surplus rule. Regarding
the debt-output ratio, the primary surplus rule performs better through the
transition but both rules stabilize just below their baseline ratios, Golden
Rule stabilizing slightly lower than its baseline compared to primary surplus
rule. In terms of growth, the growth rate of output increases under both
rules but Golden Rule outperforms the Primary Surplus Rule through the
transition and the steady state as before.
4.2.5 Lower Health-Infrastructure Elasticity
Finally, I perform experiments with the sensitivity of health output to in-
frastructure capital, namely ; using the GR and Primary Surplus Rule as
above and applying a 5 percentage-point increase to I nanced by a cut in
unproductive spending. The results are displayed in Figure 8 for  = 0:1.
Clearly, the impact of a lower elasticity of health to infrastructure is to de-
crease the fall in the debt-output ratio and debt-private capital ratio. Com-
paring Figure 6 and Figure 8, it is clear that a lower elasticity of infrastructure
in the production of health services favours PSR against GR. It takes the GR
slightly longer now in the middle panel to catch PSR and the wedge between
the growth performances of two rules is more narrow now. This is simply
because with  = 0:1 the government borrows for less productive infrastruc-
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ture under GR and the crowding-out e¤ect of debt accumulation on private
capital is thus stronger against the positive e¤ect of productive government
spending on output. This result suggests that a lower elasticity of infrastruc-
ture inproduction of health would strengthen the above results when the
government borrows for health under the GR and invests in infrastructure
through a cut in health spending under PSR. In both cases, with  = 0:1;
the results would favour health more against infrastructure and therefore the
positive a¤ects of an increase in vH through borrowing under GR and the
negative a¤ects of increase in I through a cut in vH under PSR would simply
be higher.
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5 CONCLUSION
The purpose of this thesis was to examine the performance of alternative
scal rules in an endogenous growth model with public capital and debt. In
order to do so, after a short introduction in the rst chapter, the second chap-
ter of the study provided a brief review of the current debate on scal rules
and the preceding endogenous growth literature that incorporates scal rules
in their analysis, as well as outlining the main economic motivation and mi-
croeconomic evidence behind the analytical model. The third part presented
the analytical framework, where in addition to investing in infrastructure, the
government spends in health (which raises labor productivity). In turn, in-
frastructure a¤ects the production of both commodities and health services.
In this setting, under certain reasonable restrictions, the balanced budget
rule delivers a positive growth rate and satises the transversality conditions
but the model is also shown to be (globally) unstable under this rule. How-
ever, since the case of balanced budget is far from reality for a vast majority
of countries, the chapter then considers two alternative rules a standard
golden rule where the government is allowed to borrow for infrsatructure
spending, and a standardprimary surplus rule where the government can
only borrow to nance interest expenditures. Because the resulting models
are too complex to prove stability and perform policy experiments analyti-
cally (as a result of the higher dimension added by public debt accumulation
and high non-linearity involved), they are compared numerically.
This was done in Chapter 3 after discussing the calibration procedures.
The performances of both rules were examined in response to a variety of
shocks such as an increase in the shares of spending on infrastructure and
health, a reallocation of unproductive spending to infrastructure spending
and an increase in the tax rate. Under a range of plausible parameter con-
gurations and spending shares, the numerical simulations showed that in
response to these shocks golden rule performs better than primary surplus
rule in the sense of yielding higher steady-state growth, less volatility and
more rapid convergence, despite performing slightly worse than primary sur-
plus rule in terms of debt-output ratio through the transition to the new
steady state. Moreover, the analysis also supported the idea that bias to-
wards infrastructure could hamper growth if it leads to a decrease in other
areas of potentially productive government spending such as health in this
model. As was shown, borrowing for health through a modication in the
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rule delivers higer growth than borrowing for infrastructure under golden
rule, and similarly increasing infrastructure spending through a decrease in
health spending may reduce growth and increase debt-output ratio under the
primary surplus rule.
One of the most importatnt policy lessons to be drawn from this analysis
is that even modifying the golden ruledoes not provide a clear guide as to
where one should draw the lineon current spending. This is simply because
one could always argue that education also strongly a¤ects productivity and
therefore that governments should be allowed to borrow for education by the
rule. The reasoning can of course be pushed further; it could be argued that
wages and salaries of public servants (a large share of public spending in
most countries) are productiveto some degree because they increase the
productivity of these workers and facilitate private activity. Likewise, spend-
ing on defense and security, or the environment, could be viewed as being
productive feeling safer or breathing better may lead to higher productiv-
ity. Moreover, governments may have strong incentives to present various
categories of spending as productive, even if the case is not clear. The im-
plication therefore is that drawing the linebecomes very di¢ cult, making
the practical specication of the rule extremely di¢ cult as well.
At this point, it is important to note that one further extension of this
research would be to incorporate the risk premium associated with the level
of public debt. This is particularly valid for developing economies that are
heavily dependent on external borrowing in order to close thier savings and
investment gaps. The interest rate faced by these economies includes a risk
premium that increases (in general in a convex way) with the worsening of
public balances over the world interest rate. Therefore, in such a setting, the
deviations from baseline debt-output ratio for instance, if it is regarded as an
indicator of the position of public balances, may assume great importance.
As Figure 6, Figure 7 and Figure 8 show, such a specication would clearly
favour primary surplus rule against the golden rule, particularly through
the transition process since the high negative deviations from baseline debt-
output ratios would reduce the risk premium and further contribute to the
improvement in public balances under the primary surplus rule. However,
this would also come at a cost of even lower growth a¤ect than golden rule
due to a smaller tax base to nance productive spending. Apparently, one
cannot assume a priori that the same parameter congurations would yield a
balanced steady state growth when risk premium is accounted for. Excessive
debt accumulation may always completely crowd out private investment and
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there may be no balanced equilibrium for a wide range of parameters.
A second important point is that as long as there exists heterogeneity
among parameters and starting values, imposing uniform scal rules across
the board to a group of countries because they share a common mone-
tary arrangement makes little sense. In countries where stocks of public in-
frastructure assets are relatively low to begin with, borrowing for infrastruc-
ture projects creates greater opportunity and thus makes sense as long as
the investment is su¢ ciently e¢ cient and productive. This may actually im-
prove prospects for scal stability. However, in other cases, borrowing for
other forms of potentially productive government spending may prove to be
more benecial in terms of growth. Even if the rule is slightly modied to
allow borrowing to partially nance some productive current spending, the
growth gains may be signicantly high, sometimes even higher than addi-
tional spending in
infrastructure itself. This may particularly hold again for low and middle-
income developing countries where the marginal product of health and edu-
cation is relatively high due to low level of human and health capital accu-
mulation. However, as argued above, this again brings forward the question
of drawing the line on current spending.
And nally, it must be noted that the focus on growth (and transitional
dynamics) should not lead one to neglect the fact that scal rules are also
imposed in order to prevent pro-cyclical government spending from fostering
macroeconomic volatility. To the extent that such volatility is detrimental
to growth (as shown in a number of recent studies), a potential trade-o¤
may emerge, where if a standardscal rule lowers volatility signicantly,
constraining productive spending may ultimately prove to be benecial to
growth. 15 The nature of this trade-o¤ would normally depend on a num-
ber of institutional factors, in addition the structural characteristics of the
economy. In countries where political polarization is high, or the national
legislature is fragmented across a large number of political parties, for in-
stance, the propensity to engage in procyclical spending may be quite strong
and tight rules may be inevitable. Moreover, volatility itself may have large
welfare costs, as shown by Pallage and Robe (2003), independently of its
impact on growth.
15This volatility may particularly hamper growth through an increase in the risk pre-
mium, or through various other channels in an open economy.
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To conclude, it is vital to emphasize that although this thesis does not
provide a clear-cut answer to where one should draw the line, it clearly shows
that the question of how to draw the line cannot simply be addressed by
imposing well-dened, strict scal regimes irrespective of each countrys pe-
culiar economic and political conditions. Attempts for such simple solutions
neglect the complementarities between productive government spending and
private capital, as well as totally ignoring the welfare consequences of strict
budgetary regimes. Therefore, a more thorough country-specic analysis is
required to correctly identify the growth a¤ects of scal policy and balance
the trade-o¤ between growth and volatility.
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Figure 1 Golden Rule- 5 % Increase in vI Through Borrowing 
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Figure 2 Golden Rule- 5 % Increase in vH Through Borrowing 
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Figure 3 Pr. Surplus Rule- 5 % Increase in vI Through a Cut in vT 
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Figure 4: Pr Surplus Rule-5 % Increase in vI Through a Cut in vH 
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Figure 5. 5 per cent increase in vI 
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Figure 6: 5% Increase in vI Through a Cut in vU  
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Figure 7: 2% Increase in Tax Rate 
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Figure 8: 5% Increase in vI Through a Cut in vU (μ=0.1) 
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